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Introduction
The Meanings of Deindustria/ization
JEFFERSON COWIE AND JOSEPH HEATHCOTT
The point of departure for any discussion of deindustrialization must be re-
spect for the despair and betrayal felt by workers as their mines, factories,
and mills were padlocked, abandoned, turned into artsy shopping spaces,
or even dynamited. While economists and business leaders often speak in
neutral, even hopeful, terms such as "restructuring," "downsizing" or "cre-
ative destruction," metaphors of defeat and subjugation are more appro-
priate for the workers who banked on good-paying industrial jobs for the
livelihoods of their families and their communities. In fact, the first public
use of the term "deindustrialization" identified the Allies' policy toward
Germany just after World War II: an active process of victors stripping a
vanquished nation of its industrial power. Indeed, to many workers who
walked out of the factory gates for the last time in the sunset of America's
golden age of industry, it must have felt exactly like an occupying force had
destroyed their way oflife, driving them not only from their workplaces but
often their homes and communities as well. As "the great mills fell like bro-
ken promises" across the steelmaking region of Ohio and Pennsylvania, Joe
Trotter Sr., a thirty-seven-year veteran of Youngstown's steel industry,
made the connection between the two uses of the term eXplicit. Picking
through the rubble of the dynamited Ohio Works, he remarked about U.S.
Steel, "What Hitler couldn't do, they did it for him."l
Although we have kept in mind the people caught in the cross fire of
industrial change, the purpose of this volume is explicitly to move the terms
of the discussion "beyond the ruins." While the politics and anxiety that ac-
companied the shuttering of the organized, high-wage manufacturing cen-
ters remains a key component of this book, the collective argument these
essays make is that the time is right to widen the scope of the discussion be-
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yond prototypical plant shutdowns, the immediate politics of employment
policy, the tales of victimization, or the swell of industrial nostalgia. Rather,
our goal is to rethink the chronology, memory, spatial relations, culture,
and politics of what we have come to call "deindustrialization." Emphasiz-
ing a historical approach to the problem, we seek to analyze the complex-
ity and multiple meanings of one of the major transformations of the
twentieth century. Taken together, these thirteen original essays suggest
that deindustrialization is not a story of a single emblematic place, such as
Flint or Youngstown, or a specific time period, such as the 1980s; it was a
much broader, more fundamental, historical transformation. What was la-
beled deindustrialization in the intense political heat of the late 1970s and
early 1980s turned out to be a more socially complicated, historically deep,
geographically diverse, and politically perplexing phenomenon than previ-
ously thought.
Consider, for instance, how these trends played out at Pennsylvania's
Homestead Steel Works, an icon of U.S. industrial history. On the location
that once hosted some of the greatest struggles in U.S. labor history-the
famous 1892 strike and the Great Steel Strike of 1919-and was home to
the core of Andrew Carnegie's industrial empire, now sits a strip mall fea-
turing the same retail stores that dot the big-box outer rings of most U.S.
towns. Gone are the steelworkers and their union, the United Steel Work-
ers of America; gone are their wages, their product, and the bustling civic
life they supported. On that once world-famous bend in the Monongahela
River are now a Loew's Cineplex; a McDonald's; a Target; a Bed, Bath and
Beyond; and other national chains displaying wares produced in an im-
mense global network of production. They mark the completion of Home-
stead's move from center stage in the drama of labor and business history,
to an industrial ghost town in the 1980s, and finally to "Anytown, USA," at
the dawn of the twenty-first century. While the mill once supported a vi-
brant commercial district as workers poured out of the Homestead Works
gates onto Eighth Avenue, the city itself has since been eclipsed by the faux
main street created within the retail complex to simulate-in comforting
and safe, if vapid and sterile, ways-the feel of a traditional old main street.
There is, however, one difference between Homestead's new Water-
front development and other generic shopping complexes around the coun-
try: towering over the cineplex are twelve ghostly smokestacks disembodied
from any other reference to the old steel mill-like sentries guarding
access to an already forgotten past. (See figure 1.) The strange row of
smokestacks was used as the Waterfront's advertising logo, adding some
place-specific color to the otherwise generic beige landscape of strip mall
development. While an experienced eye might see the smokestacks as mon-
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Introduction 3
FIGURE 1. Lori Delale, Twelve Smokestacks in a Strip Mall, 2001. Smokestacks sit watch
above a Loews Cineplex parking lot. For most visitors these structures serve more as com-
modified nostalgia than history, but to many these postindustrial towers are reminders that
what is now a generic shopping complex was once home to the gritty and turbulent labor
history of the mighty Homestead Works steel mill. Courtesy of Lori Delale.
uments to the many transformations in civil society, social life, economics,
and the power relations of the workplace, for most visitors they serve no
such purpose. The smokestacks are neither commemorations nor full oblit-
erations of the industrial past-they stand merely as commodified quota-
tions from a distant modern epoch, which do little more than offer a bit of
nostalgia and character to an otherwise nondescript, postmodern retail
landscape.2
In contrast to Homestead's strip mall present, when Barry Bluestone
and Bennett Harrison published their classic 1982 study, The Deindust7~ial-
ization of America, plant closings and capital flight presented an immediate
political crisis. From the vantage of a new century, however, deindustrial-
ization seems both less profound and more so. On the one hand, what we
call deindustrialization may best be understood with hindsight as one
episode in a long series of transformations within capitalism. Indeed, the
industrial age is alive and well, even if tl1e locations have changed, and even
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if the rules of investment have shifted. Not only has production migrated
with capital to far-flung points of the globe, but many areas hit hard by
"deindustrialization" in the 1980s have recently experienced a renaissance
of manufacturing-though often on different terms. In many respects, the
idea that we live in a postindustrial age smacks of a certain northern intel-
lectual conceit, and using "postindustrial" to describe our current political
economy and culture obscures more than it reveals.
On the other hand, the aura of permanence that surrounded the in-
dustrial culture of Europe and the United States throughout the twentieth
century has made the experience of deindustrialization seem more like the
end of a historical epoch. The impact on community networks and institu-
tions wrought by plant closings, and the painful realities of job loss, appear
very different on the ground to workers and their families. That we frame
our historical experience of capitalism somewhat misleadingly with refer-
ence to the "industrial era" does not ameliorate the real hardship created by
deindustrialization. The central challenge of this volume, then, is to de-
scribe a temporary, historically bound set of conditions that are experienced
in'terms of permanence by ordinary people in daily life. Like any historical
transformation-for instance, the industrial revolution itself-the process
we call deindustrialization was uneven in its causes, timing, and conse-
quences, and the effects rippled through all aspects of society. As opposed
to the changes under industrialization, however, those under deindustrial-
ization were more disorienting than overtly political, tended toward the
elusive rather than the tangible, and marked a confusion of power relations
that had seemed significantly clearer under the old order. The dramatic ev-
idence of industrial change and capital flight that litters our landscapes
does, however, present a basic collective problem: How do we account for
the destruction of an economic order that seemed so rooted and pervasive?
In the end, what may be most troubling about these ruined industrial
landscapes is not that they refer to some once stable era, but rather that they
remind us of the ephemeral quality of the world we take for granted. If Karl
Marx was right in saying "all that is solid melts into air," then the industrial
culture forged in the furnace of fixed capital investment was itself a tempo-
rary condition. What millions of working men and women might have ex-
perienced as solid, dependable, decently waged work really only lasted for
a brief moment in the history of capitalism. Because capital was fixed in gi-
ant machines bolted to the floors of brick-and-mortar factories, the indus-
trial culture that emerged in various places at various moments had an aura
of permanence, durability, and heritage.
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synagogue are all artifacts of a material culture made possible by the loca-
tion of particular incarnations of capital in space and time. Mobilized into
the service of value-added, durable-goods production, this capital provided
the basis of a limited but nevertheless expanding industrial prosperity for
workers, foremen, managers, and bosses. But the solidity of factories and
tenements and steeples masked a fundamental impermanence; it obscured
the forces that both created this world through investment and broke it
apart by withdrawing investment. Working people saw in the decline of this
industrial order the dissolution of their society, culture, and way oflife, and
the betrayal of their trust by those whose decisions shaped their fate. But
owners, investors, and corporate officers did not perceive the world in quite
the same terms. For them, the profitability oftheir enterprise, the need to
stay competitive and prosper and thus theoretically serve the greater mar-
ket good, trumped any considerations for the lives of working families on
the ground.
What does this bode for the study of deindustrialization? To begin
with, we must jettison the assumption that fixed capital investment in re-
source extraction, heavy manufacturing, and value-added production de-
fines the stable standard against which all subsequent changes are to be
judged. Rather, we should see this political-economic order and the culture
it engendered as temporary and impermanent developments in space and
time. Secondly, deindustrialization is a critical transformation in U.S. soci-
ety, to be sure, but of what kind, and to what extent? What is new and old
in this latest phase of history? How is it experienced differently by people
in varied places, times, and circumstances? And last, our scholarship must
work as hard to understand the mental and cultural frameworks of dein-
dustrialization as it has to grasp the political, technological, and financial
dimensions. What are the ideas, symbols, and images that shape our con-
ceptions of the "postindustrial" -indeed, that undergird the very way that
we think about our work lives?
The dominant method of studying deindustrialization is to trace the
death of mills like Homestead and the workers' experiences of that
process-an approach that has yielded an important body of research, even
some classics in U.S. scholarship.3 This collection builds on that scholar-
ship, but pushes for a broader range of methods, frameworks, views, and
conclusions. In what follows, we move the focus-away from a "body count"
of manufacturing jobs (a very misleading approach, since the absolute fig-
ure of manufacturing employment has actually remained fairly stable in the
postwar era, though dwarfed by the rise in service sector employment).4
Taking a cue from the changes in Homestead, we look at deindustrializa-
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-6 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
tion as a process, a historical transformation that marks not just a quantita-
tive and qualitative change in employment, but a fundamental change in the
social fabric on a par with industrialization itself.
None of this can be understood without reference to Barry Bluestone
and Bennett Harrison's politically impassioned benchmark study, from
which the actual term and political concept of "deindustrialization" entered
the popular and scholarly lexicon. These authors constructed their defini-
tion of the problem in the midst of an enormous political and economic cri-
sis two decades ago, but that definition remains the point of departure for
launching a reconsideration of twentieth-century industrial history. By
"deindustrialization," they wrote, "is meant a widespread, systematic disin-
vestment in the nation's basic productive capacity." At the core of the prob-
lem, they argued, was the way "capital-in the forms of financial resources
and of real plant and equipment-has been diverted from productive in-
vestment in our basic national industries into unproductive speculation,
mergers and acquisitions, and foreign investment." They eXplained that all
of this was symptomatic of a very specific historical juncture-the end of
the postwar boom-at which the old rules no longer worked and new rules
would be necessary for sustainable development. The old "social contract,"
based on relatively high wages and on respectful working arrangements
with unions formed in the New Deal era, had been abrogated by manage-
ment in the face of the triple squeeze of international competition, high la-
bor rates, and rising safety net costs for workers. The firms' response was
often capital mobility-whether through the relocation of manufacturing
geographically or through switching to nonproductive forms of invest-
ment-as a means of disciplining labor, fomenting regional wars for in-
vestment, and lowering the costs of doing business.
Sociologically, at the core of Bluestone and Harrison's study was a fun-
damental, even irreconcilable, tension between the needs of capital and the
needs of communities. Capital needed to control labor costs as the postwar
settlement fell apart and investors were ready and willing to build a new sys-
tem on their own terms-even if it meant destroying communities in the
process.5 Communities, on the other hand, needed the wage and tax base
provided by fixed capital investment in large-scale manufacturing to sup-
port their households, schools, parks, clubs, hospitals, civic and religious
institutions. The higher the wages, the more robust these dense social net-
works became, until in certain places at certain moments a full-fledged in-
dustrial culture tOok root.
Today the struggle to preserve basic industry that fired Bluestone and
Harrison's project is all but gone, but the legacy of deindustrialization re-
mains. This collection both accepts and departs from the fundamental in-
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Introduction 7
sights set forth in The Deindustrialization of America; it expands on the
chronology, complicates the causation, draws out the complexities, and
pushes the problem into previously unexplored realms. In so doing, we
cover six themes, each organized to challenge our assumptions about the
meanings of deindustrialization. The first part, titled "Rust," takes a new
look at rustbelt cases: a carpet mill in Yonkers, New York; an auto plant in
Lansing, Michigan; and the leisure industry in Atlantic City. We then move
into the second part, "Environment," which draws important connections
between environmental degradation and the industrial past in Anaconda,
Montana, and Love Canal, New York. Part 3, "Plans," examines the range
of responses from local, state, and federal government bodies meant to cope
with hardships caused by industrial change. The next part, "Legacy," ana-
lyzes the ways in which the industrial past is incorporated into, or denied
by, the present in three different settings. Finally, "Memory" brings us to
the kitchen tables of workers and their families in two southern communi-
ties in order to learn how they perceive plant closings and pink slips, and
how they construct notions of citizenship, community, duty, and survival in
their efforts to carry on with their lives.
The book opens with a trilogy of essays that challenge the typical view
of the causes, timing, and effects of deindustrialization in terms that are
grounded in specific firms and communities. Tami]. Friedman adds to the
growing literature that reconsiders the chronology of deindustrialization.
Her study opens with the announcement of the Yonkers mill shutdown in
1954, at the height of the postwar boom, when the employer selected
Greenville, Mississippi, as a new production site. Friedman's competitive
geography of production builds on Bluestone and Harrison's tension be-
tween "capital and community," but she reorients our understanding of the
problem. The mounting evidence suggests that the challenges faced by
places like Yonkers had less to do with the collapse of the postwar boom
than with capital mobility as a constant in U.S. industrial relations-chal-
lenges made more difficult with the globalization of industry decades later.
Her analysis of the carpet company's relocation, as well as Greenville's at-
tempts to lure industry southward, also reminds us that one town's dein-
dustrialization might just be another town's industrialization-though the
theme of labor discipline remains a constant at both sites.
The chronology in Lisa M. Fine's study of Lansing is less surprising
than that in the Yonkers case, but here causation becomes the main prob-
lem. "Who killed Reo Motors?" is the question that informs her inquiry
into the closing of a major manufacturing plant. Placing the plant shutdown
in an analytic tension between a fundamental structural transformation that
defines an era and a simpler cyclical phenomenon, she combs through mul-
-8 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
tiple explanations for the death of Reo Motors. Her approach moves well
beyond the binary of capital versus community by looking at key local fac-
tors, broad issues in the cold war political economy, and the geography of
industry, race, and urban change, all of which underscore the complexity of
a single plant closure. When the story ends with the reincarnation of Reo
just outside of town-operating under very different circumstances-the
complexity of causation is again brought to the fore. The new industrial
regime, however, makes it seem as though labor relations have been pushed
back in time, as the new firm "re-created the industrial world Ransom E.
Olds began at his first Reo Motor Car Company in Lansing, in 1904." The
historical slate has been wiped clean.
Next, Bryant Simon turns to a city that looks like many old manufac-
turing centers, but was once sustained by a very different industry-public
commercial amusements. His examination of the social life of the collaps-
ing tourist economy in Atlantic City touches on a stinging irony first aired
in the movie Roger and ]\lIe. At the end of Michael Moore's politically
charged film about the deindustrialization of Flint, Michigan, we learn that
the film cannot be shown in Flint for one simple reason: there are not any
movie theaters left to screen it. Simon's Atlantic City likewise lacks a movie
theater today, an even more galling prospect given that the town's economy
had long revolved around leisure pursuits and public amusements. He uses
the movie house as a way of understanding not just the economic transfor-
mations in the tourist industry but, very pointedly, how reactions to deseg-
regation tragically helped to destroy both a city and a service economy. The
success of the earlier, glory days of Atlantic City, argues Simon, rested on
racial segregation, and when court decisions removed racial restrictions
from those public spaces, public life died along with Jim Crow. Like so
many former manufacturing centers across the nation, Atlantic City was on
the skids by the 1970s, only to be resurrected by casino boosterism. Gam-
ing has certainly since brought money into the city, but the death of the old
industry also represents the death of the (white) "public" city, as people
drive in from far away, park in the acres of parking lots, and spend hours
staring alone at video poker machines-a far cry from the shared, though
segregated, bustling civic and commercial space of the old boardwalk.
The second part of this collection breaks new ground by bringing our
attention to issues that are intimately linked but rarely considered together:
industrial decline and environmental disaster. Here, the authors remind us
of the dual symbolism of "smokestack industries" -part might, power, and
prosperity; part pollution, waste, and toxicity. The two studies in this part,
Kent Curtis's on the former mining center of Anaconda, Montana, and
Richard Newman's on Love Canal enrich the broader debate about the
legacy
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Introduction 9
legacy of industry by bringing the key themes of environmental crisis, reg-
ulatory politics, and community activism into the story. At these two sites
the workers and their communities were left not only without jobs but with
poisoned earth as well.
Before "Love Canal" became synonymous with environmental disas-
ter, the site was called "Love's Canal," which some hoped would become a
nineteenth-century industrial utopia. The failure of this industrial dream,
Newman explains, would scarcely have registered in the historical record
except that Love's ditch, which was to supply hydro power to the commu-
nity, became a hole into which the chemical industry dumped staggering
amounts of toxic waste. The famous local activism that emerged from
the area in the 1970s was shaped not just by the rising environmental
consciousness of the nation, Newman argues, but by the experience of
working-class families faced simultaneously with layoffs and a legacy of in-
dustrial pollution. As more than two hundred firms departed the Buffalo-
Niagara region, they left behind a classic deindustrialized landscape of
poisoned brownfields. Working people, charged with the urgent need to
make their community safe from acute toxins, could scarcely afford the lux-
ury of nostalgia for a bygone industrial age.
A similar set of problems involving development, class divisions,
postindustrial transitions, and environmental catastrophe can be found in
Anaconda, Montana. \Vhen Anaconda Copper's smelters stopped running,
explains Kent Curtis, the city was left not only bereft of employment but
also in the midst of the nation's largest Superfund complex. As the town,
the company, and the Environmental Protection Agency searched for so-
lutions, they came up with the idea of building a golf course atop two hun-
dred acres of smelting waste that they buried under an earthen cap.
Although the sand traps are made of black slag and each of the eighteen
holes is nostalgically named after an old industrial installation, Curtis con-
cludes that the golf course essentially allowed all the parties involved-es-
pecially the company-enough cover to get out of their predicament. They
were able to escape from, rather than deal with, the industrial past by figu-
ratively and literally burying it. "It is a landscape manufactured not so much
to remedy the errors of the past," he explains, "as to recast them long
enough for capital to be mobilized elsewhere." The conversion of the
brownfield site into a space ofleisure and recreation provides a final, fitting
twist to one of the worst cases of pollution in the history of U.S. industry.
Since, as Curtis explains, contending with deindustrialization is more
complicated than building a golf course, the third part, "Plans," opens up a
discussion of the role of city, regional, and national politics. Here the three
chapters explore a variety of key issues, including sub urbanization, white
-10 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
flight, urban renewal, taxes, investment climate, and the pursuit of high-
technology alternatives. The authors argue that race, space, industry, resi-
dence, and local power are all intimately linked, and that strategies for
reorganizing the city after World War II took hold, often rather ineffectu-
ally, as responses to the shifting industrial and residential terrain. This set
of studies begins with Howard Gillette Jr.'s examination of the municipal
politics of Camden, New Jersey. In perhaps the best and most understated
summary of the problems faced by former industrial communities like
Camden-or Flint or Gary or East St. Louis-Gillette writes that "disin-
vestment is not a one-time process. It has cumulative effects." Indeed, plans
to deal with the snowball effect of industrial flight continually met the re-
calcitrant problem of an inadequate property tax base. As more and more
industries fled Camden, the city lapsed into fiscal crisis. With less money
from ratable industry, the city's physical plant and social life deteriorated,
and middle- and upper-income families began to flee, taking their tax dol-
lars with them. The larger the city's debts grew, then, the greater its prob-
lems became, but the greater its problems became, the less able were
municipal institutions to attract and capture business and residence. In the
absence of real support from the state or the federal government, Camden
was forced to tax already poor people and already struggling businesses even
more, leaving each successive generation of politicians to inherit a larger
and more tangled mess from their predecessors.
The "Plans" part then moves to larger geographies of analysis. Robert
O. Self's exploration of San Francisco's East Bay area reveals the tension be-
tween an old urban core and the new suburbs wrought by the flight of in-
dustry and people. The planners of Oakland, California, sought to improve
their city by recruiting industry to peripheral towns, which ironically un-
dermined the industrial growth of Oakland itself. But in the postwar era,
white citizens saw in their residential enclaves a retreat from the noisome,
dirty industries, and a refuge from the black and Latino families that had mi-
grated to the Bay Area during and after the war. Such decentralizing forces
fundamentally altered not simply the industrial landscape, but the political
one as well. A distinct politics of "homeowner populism" emerged in the in-
dustrial suburbs, linking low taxes with growth and high property values
with racial segregation. Given these complicated patterns of residential and
industrial location, Self argues, Bluestone and Harrison's term "deindustri-
alization" obscures more than it illuminates. Self posits that we ought to
think more in terms of the "spatial dynamics of industrial restructuring,"
which frame uneven metropolitan growth and expansion over time.
Such uneven spatial dynamics, argues Gregory S. Wilson, were the pri-
mary reasons behind the federal government's Area Redevelopment Ad-
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Introduction 11
ministration (ARA). Created under the Kennedy administration, the ARA
sought to build on the regional planning successes of the New Deal, but
emerged in the throes of the cold war as a weakly structured and thinly
funded attempt at industrial policy. Federal planners and policy makers
understood the important link between regional industrial decline and
poverty, Wilson explains, but they never had the funding or congressional
backing to make a dent in the problem. Moreover, race, rather than uneven
development or industrial decline, became more closely associated with
poverty among U.S. policy makers. The weakness and ultimate failure of
the ARA, then, represents an important point of transition between the
structural liberalism of the New Deal and the racial liberalism of the Great
Society. The emergent political discourse, which favored a racialized and
urbanized explanation of broad economic problems in the 1960s, left pol-
icy makers with few tools to deal with the consequences of uneven devel-
opment, regional transformation, and capital mobility.
In the fourth part, "Legacy," three chapters come to terms with the
complicated meanings of place. As various cities endure the tremendous
stress of industrial decline, they lose not only their industrial work but their
identities as well. John Russo and Sherry Lee Linkon show the double vic-
timization of Youngstown-first as a site of horrendous job loss and then
as the national poster child for deindustrialization and political corruption.
The legacy and public memory of plant shutdowns, Russo and Linkon sug-
gest, can be just as burdensome to the community as the immediate crisis
of job loss itself, reifying the symbolic weight of the city as a national site
of despair. As the community drifted from its status as a shrine to industrial
power to the "murder capital" of the nation, "locals internalize[d] the im-
age of their community as a site of loss, failure, crime, and corruption."
Thus, the problem is not simply that Youngstown as a place suffered a loss
of identity; the larger problem is that, as yet, community members do not
have the power and tools to challenge the images created about their place.
The political project that remains after the mills are gone is to reclaim a
positive civic identity by shunning the version of the town others thrust on
it and developing ways for citizens and workers to lever their own past en
route to a better future.
Similarly, S. Paul O'Hara's analysis of the image and legend of Gary is
concerned with the impact on urban culture and esteem of deindustrial-
ization. He traces several successive images of "Steel City" -a rational,
planned, industrial utopia at the beginning of the century that became a
hard-working, sin-filled, violence-prone, blue-collar town in the popular
imagination. As black workers moved north for employment and jobs be-
gan their agonizing departure, Gary's image changed first to that of a great
-12 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
"black metropolis," and then to that of an "urban wasteland." Racial poli-
tics has had a particularly devastating role in shaping the city's national sta-
tus, and the city finally became a poisoned symbol of everything the nation
was trying to avoid-jobless, black, the other murder capital of the nation.
Finally, as with Atlantic Ci ty, Gary found itself forced to embrace the casino
industry as a path toward reshaping the national understanding of a place
in which the words "industrial" and "utopia" were once linked.
Kirk Savage takes a different tack on the problem of imagery, repre-
sentation, and legacy, exploring how the industrial past is commemorated
in a city firmly committed to a postindustrial future. In his explorations of
Pittsburgh, a city that hosts the Steelers football team but does not make
any actual steel, he documents how industry is commemorated in much the
same way war is commemorated, with monuments to generals, soldiers, and
battlefields. This martial imaginary organizes the industrial past into a nar-
rative about a collective war of technological man against the wilderness.
Absent are narratives about the nature of industrial work itself, the experi-
ence of community formed by a manufacturing ethos, or the bloody con-
flicts between workers and bosses in the streets and factories of the city.
Indeed, Savage reports, reigning strategies of commemoration manage to
avoid any of the major issues of the industrial past-or the postindustrial
present. Searching the landscape, he selects an enormous pile of slag (the
same type of industrial refuse lining Anaconda's new sand traps) as the most
fitting tribute to the industrial legacy. What some see as a worthless indus-
trial dump to be covered over, others see an eco-monument to the indus-
trial past. It is in the "perverse poetry" of industrial trash that Savage finds
"a landscape that asks us to view our industrial legacy not as a heroic episode
from a golden age but as a living challenge in the present."
The fifth and final part of the book, "Memory," moves from how we
think about cities to how people think about themselves by investigating
workers' intimate understandings of plant shutdowns in two southern com-
munities. In the homes of former employees, Joy L. Hart and Tracy E.
K'Meyer listen to workers in Louisville, Kentucky, and Steve May and
Laura Morrison interview people "downsized" in Shelby, North Carolina.
These are not the old industrial lVlidwest cities that we have come to asso-
ciate with deindustrialization. While the large northern cities capture the
lion's share of scholarly attention, the main story may just be in hundreds
of small shutdowns, layoffs, and restructurings around the country. That
the South, a place known to attract migrant capital, faces its own ephemeral
industrial patterns reinforces the themes of the volume. Moreover, only
rarely did workers have the means or drive to take action, as did the
Youngstown workers who stormed the U.S. Steel building in protest of the
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mills shutting down. More typical oflaid-off workers is a conflicted stew of
emotions: betrayal and abandonment, pride and accommodation, hope and
faith in themselves and their community.
Both contributions to the "Memory" part confront the pain that comes
with the severance of the trust, loyalty, and security these workers expected
from their employers. Workers retain their pride and willingness to strug-
gle, but those traits are in danger of being overtaken by alienation and be-
trayaL We find these workers at the end of a manufacturing culture
(growing out of "red neck, smokestack places" in the words of one inter-
viewee), and entering a world of work organization largely alien to them.
As Hart and K'Meyer suggest, "they find themselves navigating divergent
sets of values-between the nominal solidarity and security of an industrial
culture and the insecure, individualized world of service and high-tech
work." Both case studies uncovered a violation of some sense of social con-
tract or perceived norms in the interrelationships among worker, employer,
community, and, in the case of factories moved abroad, nation. Bluestone
and Harrison's capital-versus-community tension is developed by workers
on their own, though more in terms of a bootstrap moral philosophy than
in terms of political economy. Interviews with employees reveal a powerful
sense of moral economy that they believe their employers violated; yet they
know they have precious little leverage over their situation. Most impor-
tantly, they do not ever want to portray themselves as simple victims. End-
ing this collection with works about the changing realms of identity
sponsored by industrial loss forces us to grapple with some of the most pro-
found and personal aspects of this historical transformation and requires us
to consider the varied and conflicting stories we tell ourselves about dein-
dustrialization.
Taken together then, what are the "meanings of deindustrialization"?
We can begin by admitting, in historian Nelson Lichtenstein's words,
that the postwar settlement is a "suspect construct."6 The decline of in-
dustry did not mark the end of a much-respected settlement between man-
agement and labor over the terms of industrial governance. It now appears
that the postwar "accord" was an idea created in the face of the continued
decline of organized labor in the 1970s.lt allowed for the creation of a semi-
imaginary historical benchmark against which very real contemporary as-
saults on unions and key industrial sectors could be measured. Clearly,
higher levels of union density, lower rates of capital mobility, and lower lev-
els of global competition in the postwar era suggest that things were differ-
ent in the "golden age," but the industrial culture was so uneven and so
poorly congealed that it hardly lives up to the quasi-corporatist notions tlIat
-14 Jefferson Cowie and Joseph Heathcott
a later generation would apply to it. As shown in Friedman's analysis of the
Yonkers mill shutdown, Self's examination of the reshuffling of investment
priorities in the East Bay, the generation of neglect Gillette documents in
Camden, or the efforts of the ARA described by Wilson, the postwar era
can hardly be characterized by stability. In opposition to a simple, unidi-
rectional story of political and economic stability followed by decline, we
deepen an industrial history characterized by unevenness, fits and starts,
and regional variance. This research reveals a history pockmarked with ex-
plosions, relocations, desertions, and competitive struggles.
Second, deindustrialization-or globalization-cannot be understood
in the simplistic logic of jobs gained or lost. Other issues, often qualitative,
are at stake. The numbers of jobs created and destroyed in the postwar era
are very large, but the gross numbers of industrial employment are fairly
stable. Quantitatively, manufacturing employment remained relatively
constant-around 18 million jobs in 1965 and about 18.5 million in 2000.
One person's plant shutdown may well have been another person's plant
opening, whether it was the opening of a plant in Greenville, Mississippi,
instead of Yonkers or one in San Leandro that some believed might have
been better placed in Oakland. Even in Lansing, as Fine shows, the new was
waiting to be born of the old, as new plants succeeded old ones. We must,
however, be cognizant of the nature and quality of those new jobs, and the
way power relations are continually reordered in the creation and destruc-
tion of employment. Although the rumors of manufacturing's demise have
been greatly exaggerated, the unionization of manufacturing has in fact
plummeted-by 40 percent between 1985 and 2000. What may be more
significant than the decline of basic industry then is the realignment of
power relations in the work place. 7Rather than arguing that simple job cre-
atio~ or destruction is the key, these contributors show that fundamental
long-term historical trends are very important to understanding seemingly
rapid changes. We have to look at issues such as spatial relations, cultural
politics, labor organization, key transformations in the urban landscape, the
political and social burdens that plague former industrial communities, the
environmental legacy, and changes in social identity.
Finally, as we avoid an obsession with numbers of jobs, we must also
proceed with caution to prevent a creeping industrial nostalgia from dom-
inating the debate. Those manufacturing jobs were not necessarily great
jobs, it is worth remembering, just good-paying jobs. Ruth Milkman has
shown in her book Farewell to the Factory, for instance, that autoworkers
lacked "any desire to restore the old industrial system that is now collaps-
ing around them." Such a perspective, she continues, "highlights a sad fact
that is all too often forgotten in the age of deindustrialization: factory work
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in the golden age of mass production was deeply problematic in its own
right." Workers, she explains, "mostly yearned to escape its relentless and
dehumanizing rhythms."8 This is not to deny the terror of joblessness or
the reality of former industrial workers tramping the Southwest in the
1980s. It is simply to say that we have to strip industrial work of its broad-
shouldered, social-realist patina and see it for what it was: tough work that
people did because it paid well and it was located in their communities.
Thus "deindustrialization" can mean many varied things, like the brief
sketch of Homestead suggests or Simon's look at Atlantic City helps ex-
plain. Only a small part of these meanings emerges from the loss of manu-
facturing employment. The broader meanings emerge from the de-linking
of investment and place, the deinstitutionalization of labor relations ma-
chinery, de-urbanization (and new forms of urbanization), and perhaps
even the loosening of the connection between identity and work. A still
broader view suggests that deindustrialization and industrialization are
merely two ongoing aspects of the history of capitalism that describe con-
tinual and complicated patterns of investment and disinvestment. These
patterns respond to new politics, technology, and cultural conditions, but
in the end the seeds of deindustrialization were in every instance built into
the engines of industrial growth itself.
Where, then, do we take our revised frameworks for the study of dein-
dustrialization? By framing episodes of industrialization and deindustrial-
ization as two stages of the same process-the organization of capital on the
ground in the material world-we can begin to come to terms with the pol-
itics required to bring justice to our shop floors, homes, and communities.
The very set of political rules that created the industrial order that we once
took to be permanent provided the means by which corporations could dis-
mantle that order. As corporate scandal and dot-com failures have created
ruins of a different sort than discussed in this volume, we must remember
that, despite the institutions, networks, and habits of the heart that give us a
sense of permanence in our communities, the rules that structure capitalism
favor growth, volatility, and change. If our goal, in the spirit of Bluestone
and Harrison's original work, is to recast capital in terms of stewardship,
democracy, and prosperity broadly shared, we have to write new rules. To
do this now, we will have to overcome "smokestack nostalgia" in our schol-
arship, complicate the industrial legacy, and assist those communities most
affected by these transformations-both in the industrialized global North
and the maldeveloped global South. Above all, we should strive to transform
the "new American workplace" that has grown out of the industrial ashes-
a place that is sponsoring spectacularly uneven levels of wealth and tremen-
dous overwork-into a more humane and responsible place.9
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